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Supporting the analysis of risks of violation in
business protocols: the MiFID case study
Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Elisa Marengo, and Viviana Patti
Abstract – Enterprises and especially banks are subject to a number of regulations,
with multilevel nature which continuously change. They must not only to adapt
their business processes to the regulations and their changes but also to evaluate the
risks of violation of the new rules and to account for responsibilities. This work
proposes a formal framework for modeling business interactions ruled by protocols
that, being based on the notions of commitment and responsibility, supports the
analysis of risks of violation when a new regulation is issued. We provide a software
tool for the visualization of the “risk space” and apply the approach to a real-work
case study in the banking sector.
1 Introduction
Business processes involve autonomous partners with heterogeneous software de-
signs and implementations. In many practical settings, the reality in which business
processes operate is characterized by a high degree of regulation. This is, for in-
stance, the case of banking and of trading services. The single organization needs
to actively determine its processes on a permanent basis, to understand how regula-
tions impact on the internal organization, to reason about possible risks of violation,
and to ensure compliance to directives and laws. In such cases, the specification
of the business interaction acquires a normative value and is commonly referred
to as business protocol. Traditionally, business protocols are tackled by means of
BPMS adopting standardized notations. Unfortunately these approaches are char-
acterized by high rigidity; they do not account for the decisional processes nor for
responsibilities. Instead, business protocols should enable a flexible enactment, to
allow the interacting parties, who are heterogeneous, autonomous, and basically
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self-interested entities, to find the way of interacting that better suits their character-
istics and requirements, and to profit of opportunities. Moreover, business protocols
must be modular in a way that simplifies keeping them compliant to regulations,
which often change along time. Let us consider the case of directives issued by
supranational authorities and institutions, these graft onto protocols, by adding new
activities which are interleaved with those of the previous protocols. Traditional ap-
proaches make protocols not suitable to easily take in new regulations because the
composition techniques, that can be applied, easily impose unnecessary orderings
of the interactions, by and large, require to rewrite the protocols from scratch.
In this work we propose to use commitment-based protocols that include tempo-
ral regulations [3]. These are fundamental in highly regulated contexts because they
allow the specification of those behavioral constraints that are foreseen by norms.
For this framework we developed a tool (available at http://www.di.unito.it/˜alice/
2CL) for allowing the business analyst to visualize and study all the possible en-
actments of a protocol, in order to detecting the possible violations. The interaction
of a set of parties complies to a business protocol (i.e. it causes no violation) if,
in the end, all the commitments they have taken were fulfilled and no temporal
regulation was broken. The analysis of possible violations amounts to the identifi-
cation of the risks the interaction could encounter. The evaluation of such risks will
allow the definition of operational strategies, that will affect the business process,
by, alternatively, preventing the occurrence of violations (regimentation) or imple-
menting alerting mechanisms (enforcement) [8]. The tool was applied to the MiFID
case study, which is one of the benchmark case studies of the ICT4LAW project
(http://www.ict4law.org). MiFID stands for the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive, directive number 2004/39/EC [1], issued by the European Commission
within the Financial Services Action Plan, which represents a fundamental step in
the creation of an integrated and harmonized financial market within EU.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces MiFID, models a sales
protocol pre-existing MiFID, and then grafts MiFID into this protocol. Section 3
shows the outcome of the tool we developed and the kinds of reasoning that this
supports. Conclusions and related works end the paper.
2 Modeling MiFID
In this work we adopt the approach to the representation of the business protocol
that is discussed in [2, 3], and which is based on commitments. Commitments are
directed from a debtor to a creditor. The notation C(x,y,r, p) denotes that agent x
commits to an agent y to bring about consequent condition p when the antecedent
condition r holds. When r equals true, we use the short notation C(x,y, p). The busi-
ness partners share a social state that contains commitments and other literals that
are relevant to their interaction. Every partner can affect the social state by execut-
ing actions, whose definition is given in terms of operations onto the social state,
see [13]. The partners’ behavior is affected by commitments, which have a regu-
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lative nature, in that debtors should act in accordance with the commitments they
have taken. Moreover, the proposal is characterized by a regulative specification
that explicitly foresees the representation of temporal constraints among commit-
ments/facts. Such temporal regulations represent, as we will see, those “grafting
points” that allow the accommodation of a new regulation inside a business proto-
col.
Definition 1 (Business protocol). A business protocol P is a tuple 〈Ro,F,A,C〉,
where Ro is a set of roles, identifying the interacting parties, F is a set of literals
(including commitments) that can occur in the social state, A is a set of actions, and
C is a set of constraints.
The set of social actions A, defined on F and on Ro, forms the constitutive specifi-
cation of the protocol, while the set of constraints C, defined on F and on Ro too,
forms the regulative specification of the protocol. We assume that facts persist in the
social state, they denote observations about events that occurred.
2.1 Pre-MiFID sale business protocol.
Let us begin by presenting a sales business protocol, that was legal before the in-
troduction of MiFID. The actions involve three parties: an investor (inv), an in-
termediary (the financial promoter f p), and a bank (bank). This protocol foresees
an initial state containing a commitment, C( f p, inv, invested), from the intermedi-
ary to the investor to find a good investment. By the action propose solution, the
intermediary presents a selected financial product to the investor. The proposal is
characterized by a risk level, and can be rejected (reject proposal) or accepted
(sign order). In the first case, the commitment of the intermediary is released. When
the order is signed, the investor commits to the bank to respect the purchase con-
tract (C(inv,bank,contract ended)). The bank is expected to countersign the con-
tract (it does it by the action countersign contract, which creates a commitment
C(bank, inv,executed order) from the bank to the investor to actually execute the
order), and send a copy of it to the investor (send contract). When the bank counter-
signs the contract, the initial commitment of the intermediary is discharged. More-
over, the bank is also expected to noti f y the intermediary the contract was counter-
signed. The notification guarantees to the intermediary that everything was fine and
he/she will get his/her commission. This should be done after the contract was sent
but before the natural end of the contract. The natural end of the contract is captured
by the action end which causes the discharge of the pending commitments of the
investor and of the bank.
The constitutive specification of actions is given by defining their meaning in
terms of how they affect the social state. The means construct amounts to a counts-
as relation [10]:
(a) propose solution means proposed RiskL if ¬proposed RiskL ∧ ¬rejected proposal.
(b) reject proposal means rejected proposal, RELEASE(C(fp, inv, invested))
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if ¬accepted proposal ∧ proposed RiskL ∧ ¬rejected proposal.
(c) sign order means CREATE(C(inv, bank, contract ended)), accepted proposal, order signed
if ¬order signed ∧ proposed RiskL ∧ ¬rejected proposal.
(d) countersign contract means contract countersigned, CREATE(C(bank, inv, executed order)),
invested if order signed ∧ proposed RiskL ∧ ¬contract countersigned.
(e) send contract means contract sent if ¬contract sent ∧ contract countersigned.
(f) notify means notified
if contract countersigned ∧ ¬notified ∧ ¬contract ended ∧ ¬contract abort.
(g) end means executed order, contract ended if contract sent ∧ ¬contract ended ∧
¬contract abort.
The protocol also includes some temporal constraints:
(c1) noti f ied −.• contract ended (i.e. noti f ied before contract ended)
(c2) contract sent •−. noti f ied (i.e. noti f ied in response to contract sent )
These constraints give the bank the freedom to choose whether notifying the in-
termediary before sending the investor copy of the contract, or the other way around.
In the latter case, (c2) imposes that after the contract was sent, the bank must per-
form the pending notification.
2.2 Grafting of MiFID.
One of the main advantages of our proposal is that it supports a modular composition
of the protocols, which is obtained by performing a simple union of the components
of the protocols (after a renaming aimed at avoiding name clashes). Intuitively, this
composition amounts to the grafting of a new regulation inside a protocol. Let us,
therefore, consider the “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” (MiFID) [1],
issued by the European Commission, and, specifically, the regulation that applies to
the offer of investment services off-site. This is the case when a bank promotes and
sells financial products with the help of external collaborators (called “tied agents”
or intermediaries). MiFID grafts onto the previously existing financial product sales
protocols. In other words, it affects a previously existing reality and must be accom-
modated with activities, that are normed by already existing regulations. It requires
the enrichment of the business protocol with new, specific actions aimed at:
• identifying the investor and supplying the foreseen documentation (interview),
• profiling the investor (profile). In the profiling process, the intermediary commits
to evaluate, with the help of a simulation, financial products in order to identify
one that suits the client (C( f p, inv,evaluation)), and assigns the investor a risk
category (investor classified).
• classifying the financial products according to the possible risk levels (classi f y).
• evaluating the proposed financial product through a simulation (fi evaluation).
This action commits the intermediary to propose a product with a risk level that
is adequate to the investor’s profile (C( f p, inv, proposed RiskL)).
• discarding solutions that are not adequate to the profile (fi discard). In this case
the intermediary’s commitments will be canceled.
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• verifying that the documentation, sent to the investment trust, does not contain
errors or missing data (order verification). If everything is right, this action com-
mits the bank to the investor to execute.
• withdrawing a contract (withdraw). This action concludes a contract by aborting
it and by releasing the commitment from the bank to execute the order.
The selection and evaluation of a new proposal are modeled as a new interaction.
(h) interview means investor identified, document supplied
if ¬investor identified ∧ ¬contract abort ∧ ¬contract ended ∧
¬rejected proposal ∧ ¬fi discarded.
(i) profile means CREATE(C(fp, inv, evaluation)), investor classified
if ¬investor classified ∧ investor identified ∧ ¬contract ended ∧
¬contract abort ∧ ¬rejected proposal ∧ ¬fi discarded.
(j) classify means classified
if ¬classified ∧ ¬contract abort ∧ ¬contract ended ∧
¬rejected proposal ∧ ¬fi discarded ∧ ¬proposed RiskL.
(k) fi evaluation means CREATE(C(fp, inv, proposed RiskL)), evaluation
if classified ∧ investor identified ∧ ¬evaluation ∧ ¬contract abort ∧
¬contract ended ∧ ¬rejected proposal ∧ ¬fi discarded.
(l) fi discard means fi discarded, CANCEL(C(fp, inv, invested)), CANCEL(C(fp, inv, proposed
RiskL)) if evaluation ∧ ¬proposed RiskL ∧ ¬contract abort ∧ ¬contract ended ∧ ¬fi discar-
ded.
(m) order verification means order verified, CREATE(C(bank, inv, executed order))
if ¬order verified ∧ order signed.
(n) withdraw means contract abort, RELEASE(C(bank, inv, executed order)),
CANCEL(C(inv, bank, contract ended))
if contract sent ∧ ¬contract ended ∧ ¬contract abort.
Actions (h–l) should be executed before the actual sale occurs, while (m–n) com-
plete the sales process but MiFID does not have the power to modify the actions
which implement a sale. The integration of the new directive with the previous reg-
ulation is, therefore, done by means of a set of 2CL constraints relating facts and
commitments: in particular, those pertaining MiFID and those pertaining sales:
(c3) C( f p, inv, invested) •−. investor identi f ied∧document supplied
(c4) investor classi f ied −.• C( f p, inv, propose riskL)
(c5) evaluation ∧ ¬ f i discarded −.• proposed RiskL
(c6) order veri f ied −.• contract countersigned
(c3) states that once the intermediary took the commitment to serve the investor,
he/she must have the investor identified and must supply the necessary documenta-
tion to him/her. (c4) expresses the fact that before committing to propose a solution
with a certain degree of risk, the investor must have been classified. (c5) states that
before proposing a financial product it is necessary to have it positively evaluated by
the simulation. Finally, before the contract is countersigned by the bank, the data of
the order must have been verified. The grafting of MiFID inside the sales protocol
is given by the union of the respective components, in particular: actions (a) – (g)
with (h) – (n); constraints (c1) – (c2) with (c3) – (c6).
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Fig. 1 Excerpt of MiFID risk space. High resolution images at http://www.di.unito.it/˜alice/2CL.
3 Detecting Risks of violation
The developed model allows reasoning about the risks of violation that are intro-
duced by the introduction of new regulations. So, for instance, what happens if an
intermediary buys a financial product for a client, violating some of the constraints
imposed by MiFID? The sale is valid, the client results to be the owner of the prod-
uct. This happens because MiFID does not define sales (sales are defined by a dif-
ferent regulation) but dictates how the interaction with the client should be carried
on. So, the violation does not affect the sale directly but creates both a risk of sanc-
tion and an risk of exposure for the intermediary. This is witnessed by a sentence
by the Italian Supreme Court (Cassazione civile a sezioni unite, num. 26724 and
26725 [6]) which decided that in case of violations, like the above, if the client was
economically damaged he/she can ask for a compensation and, in the most serious
cases, for the cancellation of the contract between the client and the intermediary.
Basically, in our model we identify two kinds of violation: a commitment is not
satisfied, a constraint is not respected. The tool that we developed allows exploring
all the possible executions of a business protocol, showing both kinds of violations.
Technically, it is an extension of Winikoff et al.’s enhanced commitment machine
[12], implementated in tuProlog, which can interpret 2CL business protocols by
means of a parser written in Java. The tool produces a graph that shows all the
possible executions visualizing the “risk space”. Figure 1 reports part of the graph
obtained in the case of MiFID. Each state represents a possible configuration of
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the interaction. Arrows correspond to actions and are directed. The source is a state
where the “if” condition of the action labelling the arc holds. The target is, instead,
the state obtained by applying the meaning of the executed action to the source
state. Basically, black arrows denote legal moves. States that are drawn as diamonds
with an incoming red arrow (e.g. states 129 and 77) represent the fact that a before
constraint, or a cause constraint or their negation has been violated. Some states
are yellow (e.g. 129 and 57), the meaning (independently from the shape) is that
some response constraints or a cause constraint are not fulfilled yet. Yellow states
with a single outline (e.g. 1 and 149), independently from the shape, mean that
there are some active commitments (not discharged, released or cancelled). States
with a double outline (independently from the shape) do not contain any active
commitment (e.g. 27, 58, 79). Final acceptable states are, therefore, white and are
denoted by double circles to express that there is no active commitment and all
constraints are satisfied (e.g. 55, 56). A legal path connects the initial state with one
of the final states and is made by all black arrows.
The legal executions are highlighted in green and pink. Notice how the actions
of MiFID (highlighted in green) are immersed in the original sales protocol (high-
lighted in pink). As the figure shows, classify and profile must be executed before
proposing a product but since there is no relation between them, they can be exe-
cuted in any order. The protocol, however, does not need to specify explicitly each of
the interleavings. Moreover, state 58 is not final: its color tells us that some commit-
ment is not satisfied yet but since no action is executable, this state is a cul-de-sac to
be avoided. Instead, proposing a solution when being in state 3 (right after interview
and classification) violates constraint (c4) imposed by MiFID.
By analyzing the graph, the designer can identify the points where it could be
helpful to intervene to reduce the possible violations, for instance, by applying en-
forcement policies or by regimenting some steps. For example, one action on which
it would make sense to intervene is propose solution. The reason is that most of ille-
gal paths start from a bad use of this action. Of course, this choice depends on many
factors (e.g. the cost of implementing the prospected solution, the time needed to
update the software) that are out of the scope of the directive.
4 Conclusion and Related Works
We have proposed a declarative approach to business protocol specification that
extends [11] by explicitly including 2CL temporal regulations. We implemented
a tuProlog extended commitment machine, which was applied to the MiFID case
study, whose output allows the analysis of the business protocol and of possible
violations. Indeed, in these contexts it is important to define mechanisms for detect-
ing possible violations and decide about possible regimentations/enforcements. One
of the main advantages of the declarative approach, that we have proposed for the
representation of business protocols, is that it supports a modular composition of
such protocols, as hoped for in [9]. Another advancement w.r.t. the literature is that
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we developed an analysis tool, which supports the business analyst in performing
task like: understanding the impact of new regulations on the business protocol or
deciding about enforcement policies or regimentation.
Telang and Singh [11] proposed a commitment-based approach to representing
business protocols and identified a set of common patterns of interaction, that can
be used by the business analyst. Along this line, also [4] proposes commitment
patterns that capture common business patterns, showing which robustness require-
ments are met by each of them. These requirements are supposed to guide the pro-
tocol designer in the selection and composition process. Concerning composition,
[14] proposes temporal operators to compose the data flow in a commitment-based
approach. The use of expressive temporal constraints allows going one step beyond
the ones above thanks to a finer-grained representation of the regulations. This is an
added value in the modeling of business interactions because it enables the embed-
ding of regulations that stratify along time.
Recently, many works, like [5, 7], focused on the problem of verifying the com-
pliance of a business process to a body of norms. This issue is different in that the
business process is rigidly modeled as a (YAWL or BPM) workflow, and the ver-
ification aims at checking if this process strictly respects the norms, providing, in
some cases, a yes or no answer and, in some others, a degree of compliance.
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